

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Briefing Note re Guided Missiles Intelligence Coordination

Facts Bearing on the Problem

1. A preliminary study on Guided Missiles intelligence coordination was forwarded by the AD/CI to the DCI through the DD/I on 26 October 1954. This study, while favoring a permanent subcommittee under the SEC, also forwarded a proposal by [REDACTED] to establish an IAC subcommittee similar to JARIC.

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2. On 29 December 1954, the AD/CI presented his position to the DCI through the DD/I and recommended the establishment of a permanent subcommittee under the SEC to handle the scientific and technical facets of guided missiles. This recommendation was concurred in by the AD/NE, AD/AR, and AD/CI. (Note: This recommendation was returned by the DD/I on 5 February 1955 with the notation that it was superseded by recent decisions.)

3. The Post Marten on NIE 11-6-72 was approved by the IAC on 3 February 1955 (IAC-M-123). Paragraph 6 of the Post Marten stated: "There also continues to be a need for effective coordination of effort in all aspects of GM intelligence." This statement was originally proposed in stronger form by CIA and met firm opposition by the IAC Representatives of the Departments of Defense; however, determined pressure on the representatives resulted in retaining a statement concerning needs for improved coordination.

4. As a result of a decision by the NSC and the DD/I, on 3 February 1955, a proposed DCID 3/6 (IAC-B-81/7) was circulated to the IAC. At the IAC Representatives' meeting on 18 February, the Service members, led by the JIC Representative, generally took the position that such a committee is not in consonance with the area of primary military interest in weapons prescribed by NSCID No. 3 and that the mechanism envisaged in DCID 3/6 is already in existence (Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee).

5. On 31 May 1955, IAC-B-81/9, a modified DCID 3/6, was circulated to the IAC for consideration. At its meeting on 14 June, the IAC deferred action on the draft and directed the SEC to report on how it could meet the objectives of the proposed DCID, to indicate

the changes in SEC's charter which an assumption of this responsibility would entail, and to evaluate the current Air Force efforts in the field of guided missile intelligence.

6. On 30 June 1955, the SEC completed its report to the IAC. Briefly, the SEC believes it can accomplish the objectives proposed by DCID 3/6 and requires no change in charter to do so.

Advantages Should SEC be Made Responsible for Guided Missiles Intelligence Coordination

7. The attainment of the objectives of draft DCID 3/6 is more likely under a mechanism to which most of the military members of the IAC give their willing support. The SEC, with dissenting opinions by Navy and JIC, has agreed to the assumption of responsibilities by SEC. The reaction to GMIC is known.

8. Assignment of responsibility to SEC represents the maximum retreat acceptable to the military agencies from their well-known position that no military weapons intelligence shall be coordinated outside the military establishment. Thus, in the eyes of the military IAC members, there will either be coordination under the SEC or no coordination of any kind under the IAC at this time.

9. The SEC, composed as it is of senior scientific and technical intelligence officers, is in a strong command position to make its decisions binding on the member agencies -- with IAC blessing it can do the guided missiles job with minimum disruption and maximum utilization of existing arrangements.

10. In agreeing to the SEC assignment, the military members have acquiesced to the first breach in their previous rigid interpretation of DCID 3/4 as permitting no SEC activities beyond integration of community opinion on production items. The opportunity is thereby offered for progress toward the concept of a centralized coordinating structure for all of scientific and technological intelligence at a time when preparatory work is needed to pave the way for a revision of DCID 3/4. This concept of centralized coordination was set forth in the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report of 1 January 1949 and has been repeatedly seconded in subsequent investigations down to those of the present Clark Committee. Establishment of a GMIC would not promote such centralization but would instead separate out another field of scientific and technical intelligence and thus weaken further the SEC.

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11. Although the need for focused attention on guided missiles is acknowledged, there is also a need to balance this effort with that accorded other top priority scientific and technical fields. The SEC is at present the only interagency group in a position to perform this function in all fields except atomic energy. The proposed CMIC would, of course, have this balancing function in the guided missile field only.

Disadvantages Should SEC Be Made Responsible for Guided Missiles Intelligence Coordination

12. The guided missiles problem is of such criticality as to require continuity and specialized competence. It cannot be handled fully by the SEC alone or with only part time support by a series of ad hoc subcommittees. Unless the SEC is willing or the IAC directs it to establish an ad hoc guided missile subcommittee to function on a continuing basis, it is unlikely that the SEC can adequately work toward the objectives of draft DCID 3/6.

13. The military will not permit any formal changes in SEC charter (DCID 3/4) such as authorizing establishment of permanent subcommittees or broadening the general scope of SEC activities. The SEC cannot handle the guided missile intelligence problem without changes in charter or interpretation thereof. The SEC proposal is tantamount to a change in interpretation of its charter. There is no assurance of continuing broad interpretation nor wholehearted support in implementation and this constitutes the weakest link in the proposed assignment to SEC.

14. O/RS and EIC, as well as the military agencies, desire to retain their responsibilities in guided missiles intelligence and are unwilling for the SEC, a scientific and technical committee, to control directly all facets of guided missile intelligence. (Note: EIC will concur in the SEC proposal if it indicates collaboration with EIC activities rather than elimination thereof. EIC is apparently willing, at this stage in guided missile development to grant paramount and initiating responsibility in the entire field to the SEC if the IAC so directs.)

15. Any coordination mechanism results in a considerable expenditure of time and may also produce a "watering down" of guidance or substantive statements. The SEC dissenting mechanism provides a channel to remove the latter weakness although double coordination (through a subcommittee and a committee) may remove some desirable sharp edges. Certainly the double coordination would require an added loss of time beyond the time spent in subsequent coordination with EIC, JMIC, etc.

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OSI [redacted] (5 July 1955)
Distribution

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